The current credit crisis has been lingering for more than
a year since August 9, 2007. This symptom was noticed when
BNP Paribas halted withdrawals from three of its funds that
had invested in subprime mortgages. Bear Stearns collapse
later highlighted the magnitude of the problem to the regulator
and the Stock exchanges alike through similar firms' excessive
exposure to mortgage markets triggered by a steep slump,
especially during June 2007 in US real estate. Now, bank
writedowns are estimated at $476 bn by the International
Institute of Finance. Though this is less than the $600
bn loss of US savings and loans crisis of the early 1990s,
about $1,600 bn have been cut from the global market capitalization
of banks. The financial crisis is spreading from subprime
borrowers, with evidence mounting that more affluent people
are failing to pay mortgages and credit card balances, and
that spreads have remained oblivious to the massive Fed
cuts. Coexistence of investment and core banking groups
has come under debate now. The crisis attained a global
scale owing to persistent US trade deficits and widening
corporate credit spreads on not only liquidity crunch, but
mainly due to the issues relating serious credit/solvency
problems, adversely impacting the corporate system.
According to Martin Wolf of financial times,"Two storms
are buffeting the world economy: an inflationary commodity-price
storm and a deflationary financial one." Nine banks
have failed so far this year, owing to shoddy lending to
homeowners and developers. `Pretty dismal' was the frank
view expressed by Sheila Bair, the head of US Federal Deposit
Insurance corporation (FDIC), on seeing the rise in the
number of banks on the danger listfrom 90 to 117.
Liquidity is what the world's financial network is lacking
at the moment. Stephen King, an economist at HSBC, points
out that the financial crises of the 1990s also prolonged
from the savings and loan collapses in US through the Swedish
banking rescues to the extremes of Japan's debt deflation.
If banks are unable or unwilling to lend, then monetary
policy will have its own limitations. The liquidity crisis
was the result of valuation related issues regarding several
types of securities used as collateral for outstanding loans.
One of the securities in question is the CDO or Collateralized
Debt Obligation. Risk aversion, measured by spreads on corporate
debt, fell sharply after the sale of Bear Stearns in March
and the resurfacing of systemic meltdown. According to Torsten
Slok, an economist at Deutsche bank, prices of junk bonds
and home equity loans imply a default rate consistent with
unemployment of around 20%. Banking liquidity injections
were carried out by the Federal Reserve through several
repo operations. These repos are nothing but temporary swaps
of quality collateral for cash as a defense against further
liquidity crunches.
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