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The Analyst Magazine:
Wall Street Crisis : Lessons for India
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There is an urgent need to build a robust regulatory mechanism that effectively monitors financial markets as our markets get more and more integrated with global financial markets in the days to come— without of course, stifling them.

 
 
 

Way back in 2000, the Per Jacobsson Foundation organized a panel discussion on "Strengthening the Resilience of Financial Systems" at the Lucerene Culture and Convention Center in Switzerland, in which Arminio Fraga, Governor of the Central Bank of Brazil, made a set of very interesting observations. First and foremost is: "If one looks back at the history of international debt crisis, certain regularities emerge." To prove his point he cited a few instances: one, the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s—too much borrowing to finance government budget deficits; two, Mexico crisis of the 1990s—too much borrowing to finance consumption; and three, the more recent Asian crisis—too much borrowing to finance investment, whereunder, somewhere along the line all these countries ended up with the problem of weak balance sheets—too much of short-term debt, which he termed stock stories, rather than flow stories. He proposed two reasons for such weak balance sheets: one, weak macroeconomic regimes; and two, a weak banking environment and a weak corporate governance environment. Then he went on to proclaim that even if we "succeed in strengthening macroeconomic regimes, banking structures, and capital markets, crisis will always happen" because "markets adjust their risk- taking to the riskiness of the environment." For instance, when the overall business conditions are deemed safer, more leverage will become the business norm.

Ironically, these remarks that Arminio Fraga made, keeping in view the financial instability noticed in developing economies, now appear to be well applicable to the credit crisis emanating from the US home loans, particularly the failure of century-old investment banks of the Wall Street. Looking at the failure of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch, one wonders if the long period of rapid growth, low inflation, low interest rates, and macroeconomic stability made these so-called specialized investment banks, which claim to have had sophisticated risk-management techniques, to take more risk with little or no awareness thereof. Weak regulation, which is often ascribed to the developing world as a ground for their financial failures, appears to have drowned the icons of the American capitalism in the form of too much reliance on free markets, which simply encouraged free play with securitization, off-balance sheet financing, and what not in the name of innovation. All this led to `over-leveraging'—to stratospheric heights—that has ironically transformed the stability in the global financial market into instability.

 
 
 

Analyst Magazine, Wall Street Crisis, Lehman Brothers, Financial Systems, International Debt Crisis, Weak Macroeconomic Regimes, Global Financial Markets, Risk-Management Techniques, Policy Makers, Stock Market, Financial Market Crisis, Economic Growth, Global Financial System.