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The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance
The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Audit Quality: Evidence from Tunisia
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., ownership structure, size, debt and the composition of the board of directors) on the external demand for a higher quality or reputed auditor. The latter, which is estimated by the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) procedure, is based on the size of the audit firm, firm’s reputation, its experience in auditing, industry specialization, and the extent to which Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are used. Using a sample of 137 firm-year observations for the period 2005-2009, the results show that board size, CEO-chairman duality, and the presence of majority shareholders positively affect the demand for higher quality auditor. In contrast, the presence of institutional investors and the customer firm size negatively impact the demand for better quality auditor. Further, the existence of independent members on the board of directors, the ownership of the CEO and the level of indebtedness of the audited firm have no effect on the choice of a reputed auditor.

 
 
 

Recent corporate financial scandals have highlighted the role of corporate governance mechanisms and specifically that of external auditors who are considered a guarantor for the reliability of financial reporting. In fact, the external auditor, who is characterized by his independence and competence, plays a crucial role for investors and financial statement users in their decision making. The choice of a higher quality auditor seems to be very important and it is in most cases the responsibility of the shareholders. In fact, some companies require a certain level of quality for the certification of annual accounts and tend to choose a higher quality auditor, while other firms are not interested in such quality.

The assessment of audit quality has attracted considerable attention of the researchers because of the lack of consensus on this issue (Carcello et al., 1992; Dumontier et al., 2006; and Manita, 2008). Many features are used such as firm size, reputation, experience in audit, industry specialization and the extent to which Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). This differentiation of quality audit has established a strong desire to understand the phenomenon of selection of quality external auditor in the Tunisian context. Indeed, it is quite recognizable that the choice of a higher quality auditor is advantageous for companies; however it can be used in an opportunistic manner.

Studies related to the choice of external auditor have been conducted mainly in the US context (Chow, 1982; Copley and Douthett 2002; and Hudaib and Cooke, 2005). However, there are few empirical studies that examine the decisions of the external auditor choice in developing countries despite the critical impact of such decision on the credibility of firms’ financial reporting.

The efforts of the Tunisian accounting and legal authorities to strengthen the role of the external auditor are expressed through the promulgation of Law No. 2005-96 of October 18, 2005 on strengthening financial relations securities.1 In addition, the scarcity of research concerning the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the demand for higher audit quality in the Tunisian context led us to deal with this subject, although most of the Tunisian firms are considered as Small and Medium Firms (SMF), which in turn can affect the probability of choosing a reputed auditor. In our study, we deal with the following two questions: What are the attributes of audit quality? How do corporate governance mechanisms impact the demand for a reputed auditor?

First, our study contributes to the previous literature by addressing the problem of demand for higher quality auditor in the normal operating conditions. Second, our research adopts an original procedure PCA to assess audit quality by exploring the impact of some variables (size, reputation, and experience in audit, industry specialization and the degree to which ICT are used) on the assessment of audit quality rather than using the simple dichotomy (Big Four/Non- Big Four). Finally, it checks whether the customer governance mechanisms are likely to motivate the choice of a reputed auditor in the Tunisian context.

The paper is organized as follows: it discusses the theoretical background of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the choice of higher quality auditor, followed by the presentation of the research methodology and empirical models. Subsequently, it discusses the results, and finally, the conclusion is offered with some limitations.

 
 
 

Corporate Governance Journal, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Audit Quality, Evidence from Tunisia, Institutional Background, Hypotheses Development, Factors Related to Ownership Structure, Presence of Majority Shareholders, Manager Ownership, Institutional Investors, Factors Related to Board Structure.