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Existence of organized futures markets furnishes an opportunity to legitimate traders to
hedge the non-diversifiable risk element contained in their portfolios and help informed
market participants to speculate on basis risk, so that they can secure risk-free profit,
which is offered as a reward to restore market equilibrium. The reward to restore market
equilibrium arises due to noise trading by uninformed market agents, which raises the
degree of information asymmetry in the underlying asset market and initiates trading at
disequilibrium price (which is reflected through jumps in the basis risk) (Cox, 1976;
Danthine, 1978; Carlton, 1984; Hodgson and Nicholls, 1991; Castelino, 1992; Mckenzie
et al., 2001; Chatrath et al., 2003; and Illueca and Lafuente, 2003). On the other hand,
informed trading by market agents is expected to bring fairness in price change of the
underlying asset and helps it to stabilize, consequently the required rate of return will
decline (Bessembinder and Seguin, 1992; and Gulen and Mayhew, 2000). Therefore, an
organized futures market is a joint product, where portfolio risk insurance is furnished to
hedgers, gambling to speculators, and arbitrageurs undertake the responsibility to restore
the market equilibrium (Telser, 1981).
Academic literature has widely appreciated the information transmission role of
futures markets, which implies that price movement in futures market can be efficiently
used to price cash market transactions (Cox, 1976; Peck, 1976; Telser, 1981; Garbade and
Sibler, 1983; and Carlton, 1984). Since both the markets are linked through an efficient arbitrage process (Garbade and Sibler, 1983; and Mackinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988),
convergence of both markets on the maturity date is natural (Figure 1). However, they may
deviate from each other during the short run. |