A
large number of studies report that acquiring firms systematically
underperform up to five years following mergers. Taken at
face value, this finding presents an efficient market anomaly
in general and a puzzle for merger activity in particular.
In their classic finance textbook, Copeland, Weston, and
Shastri (2004, p. 779) postulate that "it (long-run
underperformance) represents an anomaly in the sense that
it provides an opportunity for a positive abnormal investment
return. If acquiring firms always lose after a merger, this
suggests that investors (can) short the acquiring firm on
a long-term basis at the time of a merger announcement.
Of course, over time this anomaly should be wiped out".
But
how reliable is the documented long-run post-merger underperformance
puzzle? Fama (1998) dismisses most reported long-run anomalies
as chance occurrences and shows that these so-called anomalies
simply `disappear' with a reasonable change in technique.
Over the last decade, studies on long-run post-merger stock
performance have benefitted from various methodological
improvements. For instance, Agrawal et al. (1992),
Loughran and Vijh (1997), and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) employ
multifactor models that incorporate size and/or book-to-market
factors, which Fama and French (1992 and 1993) show as being
better specified than single factor models. However, bad
model problems are not the only hurdle in measuring long-run
abnormal performance. |