This paper looks at partition theory as regards South Asia and claims that the Bengal partition differed significantly from the Punjab model. It argues that the Punjab partition cannot be seen as a universal model. Moreover, the paper does not regard the partition of 1947 as the sole partition in Bengal, but looks at Bengal's partition history as part of a process starting in 1905 and culminating in 1971 when East Pakistan became Bangladesh. Finally, the paper emphasizes regionalism as an important component of the Bengal partitions. The paper pays attention to the physical map of partition: the delta, its rivers, ports and cities and their respective hinterlands all have their `own' histories which were reoriented after the partition of 1947. Moreover, a new geographical and political category, the enclaves that emerged post-1947, is also studied. Today, soon after the signing of the New Delhi-Dhaka bilateral agreement, this revisiting of Bengal's partition history, and the physical map of the two Bengals, is especially significant.

Most major studies of Partition migration highlight events in one particular region, Punjab, and as a result, we know more about what partition meant there than in any other province. Among the reasons for this orientation on Punjab are the violence and the dramatic, swift and almost complete expulsions of minority populations from both its parts immediately following partition. This lives on in Southasian memory; the number of films on the Punjab partition only serves to keep that memory alive.

There are certain elements in the partition of 1947 in Bengal that stand out and this paper argues that the Punjab model is not universal. Unlike Punjab, there was no total transfer of population in the Bengal case. The Punjab Partition saw an almost complete and dramatic swap of people—Hindus and Sikhs went to India, Muslims went to Pakistan in 1947. This theme too continues to be the staple of best selling novels. In the case of Bengal, fewer Muslims went over to East Pakistan. More Hindus came over to India. This has significant implications that resonate today in cases of cross-border traffic and terrorism, as well as in incidences of continued human suffering.

Cross-border migration in Bangladesh differed substantially from what happened in post-partition Punjab. It consisted of a number of quite distinct population movements, each with its own time scale, and the overall picture is not one of a swift, bloody and almost complete exchange of minorities. Here migration flows that were swift (optee migration) were not bloody. Bloody expulsions certainly occurred (1950, 1962), but did not follow swiftly upon partition, and there was never an almost complete exchange of minorities. Furthermore, specific types of cross-border migration flourished here till the mid-1960s (property exchange) and beyond (labor migration, displacement by education, and marriage migration) that have not yet been described in detail for other parts of the Partition border. We need to be very cautious: at least in the case of Partition migration, the Punjab experience cannot be employed as a model, short hand for what partition entailed, the prime case from which to draw general conclusions. We will see in what respects the Bengal partitions (I use the plural here deliberately), differed from the hegemonic Punjab model.

History and Culture Journal, Partitions, Southasian Memory, Bloody Expulsions, Partition Border, Cross-Border Migration, Marriage Migration, Demographic Profiles, Historiography, Conventional Categorization, Agricultural Land, Agrarian Communities, Border Security, Forest Products, Economic Nationalism, Economic Independence.