Traditional finance literature often assumes that investors on financial market
are rational. Hirshleifer (2001), Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Shiller (2002) argue that
a `rational' investor is an investor who makes a relevant expectation based on all
available information. This is done by updating beliefs using Bayes' rule. This investor must
also make decisions according to the expected utility function of Von Newman
and Morgenstern (1947), a utility function defined over wealth or consumption.
However, experimental evidence suggests that investors, in a context of uncertainty, proceed
to judgments which give rise to subjective probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). In fact, after the release of new information on financial markets, investors
commit cognitive errors when updating their beliefs of future profits. These errors are
heuristics and biases which correspond to investor `cognitive rationality'. Moreover, Allais
(1953), Ellsberg (1961) and Tversky (1969) find that investors have a different
preferencefunction from that of the expected utility.
To explain these findings, a relevant literature argues that investor preference takes
a form of a non-expected utility
function.Examples of non-expected utility theories
are the weighted utility theory of Chew and Mac Crimmon (1979) and Chew (1989),
the theory of implicit expected utility of Chew (1989), the theory of regret aversion of
Bell (1982), the theory of disappointment aversion of Gul (1991) and the prospect theory
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
Of all these non-utility theories, the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) is most emphasized in the finance literature. Indeed, prospect theory offers a
descriptive framework to understand how individuals make decisions in the context of risk
and uncertainty. It describes several statements that can influence the decisions of
the investor. The main element of this theory is loss aversion. Loss aversion is a form of a
first risk aversion which reflects the fact that people express more sensitiveness to losses
than to gains of the same magnitude. |