The ultimate aim of any modern corporate is growth with profit maximization. Growth is the first and foremost characteristic of nature and its products which include modern societies with all their industrial, agricultural and service sectors and above all the research organizations to cater to the needs of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Governed by the laws of the universe and nature, societies, markets and above all human life are in the constant churn of development in the realm of creativity and innovativeness.

This article attempts to identify some problems of interpretation of the 1996 Act regarding the appointment of arbitrators by the parties and focuses attention on the inequity of thrusting in-house arbitrators by government and government corporations on individuals and contractors who are left with little choice but to sign on the dotted line in a "take it or leave it" situation. The article draws support from the IBA Guidelines on the independence and impartiality of arbitrators.

In the matter of appointment of arbitrators in particular, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 was perhaps influenced to a great extent by the existing international arbitral practice, built over a period of time particularly under the aegis of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. In international practice, the arbitral commissions are classified into sole and mixed arbitral commissions, depending on whether there is a single arbitrator appointed by all the disputants or whether the disputant parties have appointed an arbitrator each with an umpire to preside over the commission. Sole arbitral commissions, as well as mixed arbitral commissions, have rendered historic awards as in the case of Island of Palmas Arbitration (Max Huber as the sole arbitrator) and the Abu Dhabi Arbitration and Qatar Arbitration (Lord Asquith and Lord Radcliff as arbitrators, respectively). In the case of mixed arbitral commissions, as in the case of India-Pakistan Rann of Kutch Arbitration (1968), parties appoint an arbitrator each and the parties by mutual agreement appoint the umpire and if they fail to agree on the umpire, the usual practice is to authorize the Secretary General of the United Nations Organization to nominate the umpire.

The international arbitral practice regarding the appointment of arbitrators had to some extent an impact on the procedure even in the case of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. In cases where both the parties do not have judges of their nationality on the Court, they are permitted to appoint ad hoc judges for the purpose of the particular case before the Court and, if one of the parties has a judge of its nationality already on the Court, the other party is entitled to appoint an ad hoc judge for the duration of the case. This is, indeed, a practice of the ICJ which might look rather strange for the lawyers trained in the Common Law tradition, and the practice is clearly a carry forward from the international arbitral practice. The practice of the disputant parties appointing an arbitrator each and of the presiding officer being appointed by the Court under Art. 11(3)(b) of the Model Law or by the Chief Justice under S. 11(5) of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 is clearly an adaptation of the international arbitral practice.