There has been much debate as well as
different perspectives within literature on the subjects of `shame' and `guilt'
and, how shame differs from guilt (Ausubel, 1955; Lewis, 1971; Baumeister, Stillwell,
& Heatherton, 1995; Jacoby, 1994; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Benetti-McQuoid &
Bursik, 2005). Additionally, the overlap of these emotions as a result of the similarities
in the situations within which they occur, often leads to these terms being
used interchangeably (Jacoby, 1994). For the purposes of this research, we will first
briefly define `guilt' and `shame'.
`Guilt' has to do with ethical and moral principles (`socialization'; `should
have'; `obligation') whose fulfilment is generally good, but the feeling of guilt usually
is experienced as an unpleasant emotion, sometimes unhealthy emotion
(Dryden, 1994), when a moral/societal standard has been violated or a crime has been
committed (Benetti-McQuoid & Bursik, 2005).
This feeling is directed outward at a particular behaviour committed by the
individual, whereas `shame' is defined as an
unpleasant, sometimes debilitating, emotion accompanied by a negative evaluation
of oneself, characterized by an internal self-doubt and chastisement (Kubany &
Watson, 2003; Jacoby, 1994) - and ultimately affecting the well-being of an individual.
From Freud's perspective, guilt is neurotic, destructive, largely unconscious,
and irrational. The guilty individual withdraws socially, ruminating over
transgressions, castigating the self for real or
imagined shortcomings (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). |