Ever
since the corporate form with limited liability emerged, the problems of corporate
governance made their way into corporations. Though it is difficult to trace back
to when this word was coined, there is a convergence in the views of academics
and researchers that, before 1932, corporate governance was not viewed seriously.
The theory of separation of ownership and control propounded by Adolph A Berle
and Gardiner C Means laid the foundation for generations of research in understanding
the nuances of corporate governance. Though most of the early literature concentrated
on the expropriation of the shareholders' wealth by the managers, today, corporate
governance research has come of age and its scope has broadened.
Corporate
governance is viewed as a composite whole, that draws together elements that simultaneously
help in determining the qualitative and quantitative aspects of business (Julie
Margret, 2001). A more focused view of corporate governance issues can be established
by questioning who is benefited, and who should be benefited from corporate decisions
or senior management actions (Cochran and Wartick, 1988). A corporate governance
issue exists when there is a conflict between `what is' and `what ought to be.'
Conflicts
arise whenever there are differences in perspectives amongst the actors involved.
And wherever there are conflicts, problems of governance exist. The primary reasons
for conflicts in interests amongst the actors in a firm are their differing objectives.
Though many theories of firms have been propounded over the past few decades,
it is seen that not many authors have focused on the behavioral aspects of a firm.
The `Theory of Markets' passed off as the `Theory of Firms'. Economic theories
have taken a long time to explain the rationale for existence; and more so, have
severely failed to explain the boundaries and internal organization of the firms.
All that the economists proffered as the `Theory of Firms', was subsumed in the
basic argument of `price theory.' |