Feb'20
Focus
Generally, the capital ratios are in the form of a risk-based capital ratio or a leverage ratio. The Basel III framework has suggested a regulatory minimum leverage ratio that defines a stand-alone Tier 1 capital ratio (Tier 1 capital overexposure) as a supplement to the prevailing capital adequacy ratio. The leverage ratio is expressed as the percent of Tier 1 Capital to the Total Consolidated Assets. Simply put, Basel III suggested that leverage ratio determines the level of a bank's core capital to its total assets. Essentially, the Basel III-proposed leverage ratio acts as a ring-fence to the risk-based capital measure. While the leverage ratio connotes the level of loss that the bank equity can absorb, the risk-based capital ratio indicates the maximum capacity of a bank to withstand the potential losses.
The main purpose of the leverage ratio is to offset the systemic risk by restraining the impacts of risk-weight density during boom periods. In a way, it is envisaged to act as a countercyclical regulatory instrument, being tighter during boom periods and flexible during periods of busts. It is expected that when the bank capital is regulated to behave in this pattern during the business cycles, the likelihood of the crisis as well as the magnitude of the impact of the possible crisis can be minimized.
In India, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has stipulated a leverage ratio of 4.5% for Systematically Important Banks (SIBs) and 3.5% for other banks. In the case of well-capitalized banks, as their Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) is higher than the RBI stipulated regulatory requirement, it encourages increasing the exposure. On the other hand, for capital-starved banks, the additional exposure needs to be of lower risk-weights.
It is desirable to recognize how the leverage ratio evolves over the cycle as against the CAR. Further, it is essential to know how excessive leverage in the banking system can be restrained to enhance bank stability.
The first paper of this issue, "Leverage and Risk-Weighted Capital in Banking Regulation", offers a critical review of banking regulation in the context of the leverage ratio and
risk-weighted capital. The paper highlights the potential drawbacks of the recent regulatory changes in the US. The author, Rainer Masera, claims that though the two regulatory measures (i.e., leverage ratio and CAR) seem to be complementary, there is a need for rigorous supervision, instead of looking for an optimal ex ante standardization that might turn out to be
time-inconsistent. The paper underscores the importance of effective corporate governance and efficient interaction between banking supervision and internal control mechanisms in ensuring sensible banking regulation.
In India, recently, an Urban Cooperative Bank (UCB) failed to honor the claims of a large number of its depositors, leading to a crisis situation that forced the RBI to limit the amount a customer could withdraw from their deposit accounts to 1,000 for some time. This incident led to concerns among the general public on the safety of their deposits with the cooperative banks. In the second paper, "When and Why Cooperative Banks Fail? The Case of Urban Cooperative Banks in India", the authors, Ajit Kumar and Ashish Srivastava, analyze the key factors that lead to the failure of cooperative banks, particularly the UCBs, in India. According to the study, the instrumental factors for such a failure of the UCBs are poor governance benchmarks, frauds, regulatory breaches, liquidity constraints and bad asset quality. More particularly, the paper states that governance and managerial malpractices lead to such causative factors that lead to cooperative bank failures. The authors suggest that implementation of proper governance standards, integrity in financial disclosures, effective management controls, continuous regulatory scrutiny and supervisory oversight of the banking processes would help minimize bank failures.
The third paper, "Bank Nifty: Empirical Modeling of Returns vis-a-vis Leverage and Volatility", by Neelam Tandon, Deepak Tandon and Navneet Saxena, explores the bank Nifty closing price time series to explicate the past and predict the future of a return series. In doing so, the study estimates the volatility and leverage effect in bank Nifty returns over the study period. As mean and variance may not adequately explain the distribution of returns, the authors claim that the degree of symmetry in return distribution is useful for investor's asset holding. In the backdrop of the transition of Indian banking into a higher trajectory with the incorporation of new technologies and innovative products, the authors analyze the bank Nifty returns, the extent of volatility and the leverage effect. The authors employ ARCH, GARCH, and EGARCH models and find that EGARCH is the best fitting model to measure the performance of bank Nifty returns over the study period. The findings suggest that the higher the leverage effect, the greater the risk or volatility or variance of banking stock. Further, during periods of high volatility, bank's exposure increases and investors shift their funds to less risk-prone investments.
Leverage and Risk-Weighted Capital in Banking Regulation
This paper offers a critical survey of the swings in banking regulation, notably with reference to leverage and Risk-Weighted Ratios (RWR). At the outset, a distinction is made between economic and Regulatory Capital (ReC) and between private and social costs/benefits of equity finance for banking firms. The inherent limitations of the transformation process of assets into a combined size-risk metric, amplified by Negative Nominal Interest Rates (NNIRs), are brought to the fore, as well as the relative ease of circumventing the rules. The complexity of regulatory risk weighting creates significant (fixed) compliance costs. Unless appropriate tiering is adopted, a competitive distortion is created in favor of large banking institutions. These shortcomings were especially evident in the Basel II standard. With reference to the Basel III/IV framework, it is argued that the two regulatory ratios (leverage and risk-weighted capital) can be complementary, but require close and constant supervision, rather than the quest for an optimal (steady state) ex ante calibration, which may prove time inconsistent. Emphasis should be placed on corporate governance and on the effective interaction between supervisory activity and internal controls. This is usefully complemented by stress-testing techniques which are less model-dependent. Potential drawbacks inherent in recent regulatory changes in the US (community banks have now the option of abandoning tiered risk-weighted requirements and adopting exclusively a leverage constraint, higher than 9%) are indicated.
When and Why Cooperative Banks Fail? The Case of Urban Cooperative Banks in India
The financial system in India has been by and large robust, and there has been no major commercial bank failures. However, notwithstanding a well-regulated structure, several Urban Cooperative Banks (UCBs) have indeed failed and caused losses to depositors and other stakeholders. Therefore, the question as to when and why the UCBs fail is a critical issue to examine and evaluate. This study identifies the key factors for their failures, which can be monitored effectively to prevent any further instances of failure of UCBs in India.
Bank Nifty: Empirical Modeling of Returns vis-a-vis Leverage and Volatility
The Indian banking industry has been changing at a fast pace along with the change in the macro fundamentals of the country. The banking stockholding investors would always be interested in knowing the rate of return and its variance over the holding period. Domestic market returns contain the predictive information on bank Nifty returns. To analyze the return on banking stock, the authors have used the logarithm change in the bank Nifty index series consisting of the daily closing prices of the index over the period of January 2, 2012 to September 6, 2017. The series depicts the period from January 2, 2012 to February 2, 2014 with lower volatility, followed by higher volatility from February 3, 2014 to September 6, 2017. As asset prices tend to behave as random walks, the objective is to accurately capture the behavior of the conditional volatility. To nullify the impact of structural break in the variance series that can create the appearance of a highly persistent conditional volatility, the authors have conducted Bai-Perron test of sequentially determined breaks. Based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) values, the EGARCH model has been selected as the best fitted model. The authors have concluded that the EGARCH model better captures the leverage effect as bad news has greater impact than good news on bank Nifty stock returns. Investors are prone to shift their investments in case of high volatility, which can be adduced to bad events such as NPA ballooning effect, restructuring and waiver, and inflationary effect.