In the recent past, growing China’s engagement in the Indian subcontinent in particular and its increasing footprint in global affairs in general categorically reveals its overreaching strategy to expand its global influence. The main force behind this move is, of course, its remarkable economic growth which it has accomplished in the last three decades.

The ongoing decline in the role of the US as a global superpower has only offered China an opportunity to present itself as a reliable alternative model with its own set of values—its “core national interests”, namely, territorial integrity, One-China policy, and the Chinese party-state governance model. Leveraging on its fiscal strength—switching over to an investment-driven model from an export-oriented model—it has simultaneously funded infrastructure projects in smaller countries located in Africa and the Asian subcontinent, which incidentally minimizes its suffering from any trade disputes—should they arise at a later date—while maximizing its ability to inflict serious economic damage on the host countries.

This strategy has indeed helped China’s political system to fan the nationalist sentiment domestically. And this in turn has helped its political leadership to consolidate its party-state governance model that facilitated the leadership to get away with no democratic accountability, which incidentally bestowed on its leadership additional strategic options such as faster and quieter mobilization of resources—both men and material—with ease unlike in the democratic countries.

Its place in the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member has bestowed on it significant clout, which it is using to advance its geopolitical interests very shrewdly. Additionally, it is also building up new institutions with a hope to ultimately act as their head. And this cumulative strength is being used by it to offer opportunistic support or to deny it as it suits its strategic options—as for instance offering support to Pakistan in the Wassenaar agreement and blocking a proposal much sought by India at the United Nations to designate Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist four times.

President Xi Jinping has made “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” as his objective, and this well reflects in its military build-up and expansive territorial claims. Against this backdrop, though China claims its initiatives—such as the security groupings it formed with Russia, and the former Soviet states in Central Asia and labeled the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, ‘BRICS Bank’, ‘Belt and Road’ project, etc.,—as ‘win-win’ meant for “common destiny of mankind”, its neighboring countries perceive them as “self-serving and expansionist”. Indeed, China’s leaders strongly believe that the next 20 years provide it “a strategic window of opportunity” to achieve its objective of national revitalization. These pursuits of China are in effect driving its neighbors to spend unprecedented sums on their own military build-up, that too, at the cost of development.

Against this backdrop, many intellectuals feel that competition in some form or the other is inevitable between India and China. Whatever might be the developments, one thing is certain: the geopolitical landscape of Asia has dramatically changed and it is irreversible. In this context, in the paper, “Understanding the Assertiveness of China: From the Annals of History”, the author, Keshab Chandra Ratha, tracing its history, observes that China is known for causing anxiety among its neighbors through its actions of unilateralism. Reviewing its assertive behavior in the recent past, the author avers that its foreign policy pursues calculated self-interest at the cost of international institutions, standards and obligations. The author cites China’s claim on international waters, island territories and air space over South China Sea (SCS), East China Sea (ECS), etc., in support of his argument that China has become more assertive under Xi’s leadership.

Moving onto the next paper, “Bangladeshi Migration to India: Hindrance to Regional Cooperation”, we hear from its author, Rudra Prasad Sahoo, that illegal cross-border migration from Bangladesh poses a grave threat to India’s security and any acceptance of migrants on humanitarian grounds would only become a cumbersome affair. Besides, this issue has become a serious stumbling block in shaping India’s foreign policy, argues the author. Stating that migration, being a sensitive issue, demands meticulous analysis, the author suggests certain ways and means to minimize its threat to India’s internal security and offers a right perspective to accomplish regional cooperation.

The paper, “Fallacious Deterrence Theory of Waltz in the Context of Indo-Pak Conflict Over Kashmir ”, argues that the deterrence theory of Waltz which states that ‘whoever gets nuclear weapons behaves with caution and moderation’ and whoever has nuclear weapons does not ‘get attacked militarily’ does not hold good in the case of Indo-Pak conflict over Kashmir. Tracing the long history of enmity between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the author of the paper, Rameez Raja, mapping the irrationality of the decision makers of India and Pakistan, holders of nukes, observes that nuclear weapons have little or no influence in averting a war between India and Pakistan.

In the last paper of the issue, “The Role of Indian Diaspora: A Look at India-Myanmar Relations”, its authors, Mohammad Janesar and Rajesh Sahu, arguing that Myanmar has become a critical country for India’s “Act East Policy” (AEP), have examined the role of the Indian Diaspora, the ‘soft power’, in ensuring the internal and external security objectives of India. They have also offered suggestions for improving India’s relations with Myanmar.