Competition
in Indian Manufacturing Industries: A Study Using Static
and Dynamic Measures of Concentration
-- K
Pushpangadan and N Shanta
Recent
studies concluded that economic reforms have not provided
any clear evidence of increased competition, suggesting
that monopoly has increased or remained the same. Since
the traditional static measure of concentration is not a
reliable indicator of the monopoly, static and dynamic measures
of concentration are integrated to test the hypothesis.
This paper makes an attempt to study 14 major Indian industries
for which firm-level data are available for the period,
1989-2001. This integrated approach shows that the monopoly
has: (i) increased in two industries; (ii) remained the
same in two others; and (iii) reduced in the remaining ten
industries. Out of these ten industries, in four industries
large firms lost shares to other large and small firms and
in two industries large firms lost shares only to small
firms. In the remaining four cases, large firms lost shares
only to other large firms implying that, competition was
restricted to a particular group only. The study also clearly
indicates that only by integrating static and dynamic measures
the power of monopoly can be clearly assessed.
© 2005 IUP. All Rights Reserved.
Performance
Analysis of Some Selected Hardware Companies
-- Surajit
Ghosh Dastidar
This
paper deals with an empirical study to measure the performance
of some selected hardware companies. The methodology was
based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The performance
(efficiency) of the selected hardware companies were determined
over a period of three years (2001-03) in order to examine
if there is a trend.
© 2005 IUP. All Rights Reserved.
Product
Market Competition and the Boundaries of the Firm
This
paper identifies increased product market competition as
a source of quality production. As competition increases
consumers can tone down the cost further by increasing the
product quality with the efforts of either the manufacturer
or retailers. Further study reveals that allocating property
rights to competent retailers has the advantage of transferring
post-bargaining power.
©
2004 Jean-Etienna de Bettignies. All Rights Reserved. The
IUP holds the copyright for the summary.
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